Rochester Institute of Technology

RIT Scholar Works
Theses
5-7-2019

The Opioid Epidemic
Abigail Hallowell

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses

Recommended Citation
Hallowell, Abigail, "The Opioid Epidemic" (2019). Thesis. Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed
from

This Master's Project is brought to you for free and open access by RIT Scholar Works. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of RIT Scholar Works. For more information, please contact
ritscholarworks@rit.edu.

The Opioid Epidemic
by

Abigail Hallowell
A Capstone Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Criminal Justice
Department of Criminal Justice
College of Liberal Arts

Rochester Institute of
Technology Rochester, NY
05/07/2019

RIT
Master of Science in Criminal Justice
Graduate Capstone Approval
Student: Abigail Hallowell
Graduate Capstone Title: The Opioid Epidemic
Graduate Capstone Advisor: Dr. Irshad Altheimer
Date:

2

History of the Opioid Epidemic … 4

Table of Contents

Government Responses to the Opioid Epidemic… 17
Responses to the Opioid Epidemic in Monroe County … 39
Analysis of Opioid Overdoses in Monroe County … 56
References … 78

3
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Introduction
Drug abuse, addiction, and overdoses are phenomenon’s that are not new or unfamiliar to
the United States. Between 1999 to 2017, there were over 700,000 drug overdose deaths in the
country. About 400,000 of those drug overdoses involved an opioid. In 2017, more than 70,000
people died of a drug overdoses and 68% of them involved an opioid. This makes the number of
opioid drug overdose deaths in 2017 six times higher than in 1999 (Center for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2018). The severity of the increase in opioid related overdose deaths that
America is experiencing today did not happen randomly. The growing number of citizens who
are addicted to opioids and overdosing on them has become a cause for concern for citizens,
public officials, and government agencies. In 2016, a Kaiser Family Foundation poll found that
56% of Americans knew someone who abused, was addicted to, or died from an opioid overdose
(Dijulio, Firth, Hamel, & Brodie, 2015).
The opioid epidemic in the United States has a long history beginning in the mid-1990s.
When attempting to understand why the United States is facing this crisis it’s necessary to dive
deep into the history of how opioids have become prominent all over the country. This epidemic
did not happen overnight – quite the opposite. It has been a long and painful journey of
addiction, pain, and death. This paper is intended to dig into the history of the opioid epidemic in
America and explain how it came to be declared a public health emergency by our government in
2017 (Jones, 2018). An epidemic that is unique to the United States, it is worth analyzing what
differs in American history that led to an epidemic that kills an average of 130 Americans per
day (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018).
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Brief History of Opium
Opioids and heroin derive from an addictive substance called opium. Opium abuse has
had an extensive history across the world, its earliest recordings dating to 3,400 B.C. in
Southwest Asia (DEA Museum, 2019). The popularity of the drug and its effects passed on to
other countries, and there was soon a growing demand for opium and morphine (another
powerful opium drug). After making its way to China, the drug became the catalyst for two wars
between China and Britain in the 19th century. In 1853, Dr. Alexander Wood, the Scottish
inventor of the hypodermic needle, believed that smoking or swallowing morphine was the cause
for addiction, whereas intravenous injection would provide a loophole. During the Civil war in
the 1860s, injecting opium became common to use on soldiers who had been hurt to treat pain.
Opium addiction became particularly severe among white Southerners in small towns and cities
where heartbroken family members turned to opium to deal with losing their loved ones and
economic despair brought on by the abolition of slavery (Macy, 2018).
Despite its popularity during this time, there were a few doctors who sounded the alarm
on opium and morphine addiction and argued for stricter regulations. In 1884, the Virginia
General Assembly considered placing regulations on prescribed opium and morphine due to
pleas from a Richmond doctor W.G. Rogers The legislature decided against approving the bill to
regulate these addictive substances (Macy, 2018). With acceptance and demand for opium
growing, it is of no surprise that the invention of heroin in 1898– a drug already ten times
stronger than opium – was a booming success. By 1900, more than 250,000 Americans were
already addicted to opium-derived painkillers (Musto, 1973).
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Opioids in the United States
In 1924, twenty-six years after the release of heroin, the manufacture of the drug was
outlawed in the US with the passing of the Heroin Act (Jones et al., 2018). Having already
become addicted to the substance, many heroin users were forced to turn to the illegal drug
market to purchase the drug. This event marked a turning point in how addicted persons were
classified in the public eye. Before outlawing heroin, iatrogenic addicted opioid users were more
common and not as publicly detested. Heroin users were now referred to as “junkies” and society
cast them to the side. As government officials began enforcing these regulations, some began to
view heroin users as criminal. The population of opioid and heroin addicted people was
neglected by most of society during this time. This trend continued until recent years, where
opioid addicted persons may now be viewed again as addicts in need of treatment and recovery.
Although evidence existed against opioids and its addictive qualities, opioid prescription
pills were sometimes prescribed by doctors in the United States. However, until the release of
two retrospective publications that argued opioid addiction was rare, using opioids to treat pain
was vastly limited in the medical industry. In 1980, an article was published describing low
(0.03%) addiction rates for inpatients receiving opioids for acute pain (Jones, 2018). Six years
later in 1986, another article was released claiming that in a study done on 38 patients, only 2 of
38 patients with chronic pain developed misuse or abuse issues when receiving opioids
(Portenoy & Foley, 1986). The scientific rigor of these studies has since been questioned and
discredited a great deal.
After these publications, The World Health Organization addressed the under-treatment
of postoperative and cancer pain in 1986 with their Cancer Pain Monograph – detailing how
cancer pain relief has been neglected among the medical and public health communities (WHO,
7

1986). Shortly after in 1990, an article published in a scientific journal questioned why opioids
were only prescribed to treat cancer-related pain and avoided entirely non-cancer chronic pain
states (Melzack, 1990). The study prompted interests that were based on fallacies, drawn mainly
by cancer pain specialists lacking expertise on other chronic, non-cancer pain (Jones, 2018).
In 1995, the American Pain Society announced a presidential address and launched an
influential campaign called “pain as the fifth vital sign”. The campaign advocated for proper,
standardized evaluations and treatments of pain (Campbell, 1995). The Veterans Health
Administration lent support to the campaign in 1999 (Jones, 2018). By 1999, 86% of patients
using opioids in America were using them for non-cancer pain (Lui, Pei, & Soto, 2018). The
following year, the Joint Commission (TJC) published standards for pain management,
emphasizing the need for organizations to conduct quantitative assessments of pain. The nation
continued responding well to these efforts. In 2002, the Federation of State Medical Boards and
the Drug Enforcement Agency issued statements promising less regulatory scrutiny over opioid
prescribers, thereby reducing physician’s reluctance to prescribe more liberal amounts of opioid
pills (Joranson, 2002).
After the medical industry began developing a new standard for pain assessment and
pain treatment. This movement led to doctors and nurses being economically incentivized to treat
pain more liberally and it shifted the thinking towards patients as health care consumers.
Pharmaceutical companies heavily pushed the use of opioids as a humane treatment option, often
using paid physician consultants to expound on the safety and benefits of opioids use (Jones,
2018). Since the beginning of the pain movement, the rate of opioid prescription use in the US
has skyrocketed.
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From 1999 to 2011, consumption of hydrocodone more than doubled and consumption of
oxycodone increased by nearly 500%. From 1997 to 2011, there was a 900% increase in
individuals seeking treatment for addiction to opioid pain relievers (Kolodny et al., 2015). With
the surges in opioid distribution and opioid addicted persons seeking treatment, it is of no
surprise that a drastic increase in fatal opioid-related drug overdoses occurred during the same
time. The shocking correlation between the three statistics can be shown in the chart below;

*Source: (Kolodny et al., 2015)

This chart illustrates the rate of opioid sales, opioid deaths, and opioid treatment admissions
between 1999 and 2010 (Kolodny et al., 2015). This chart confirms the direct relationship
between opioid overdoses and the medical industry’s production of opioid prescription pills. The
graph implies that as the number of opioids being sold or prescribed increases, the number of
people becoming addicted to the substance and overdosing on it also increases. A large
contributor to the number of opioids being sold, a prescription opioid known as Oxycontin was
one of the most popular pills being used during this time.
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Oxycontin and Purdue Pharmaceutical

In a remote western corner of Virginia, Lee County was home to the introduction of the
opioid painkiller known as OxyContin and was a hot spot for the plethora of other opioid pills
that hit the nation beginning in the mid-1990s. Although the opioid epidemic has impacted every
part of America, this area in the former mill and mining communities of central Appalachia is
important to mention because it was impacted more severely than other communities. Lee
County the area where OxyContin was introduced, and it was a hotspot for a plethora of other
opioid painkillers. The overdose rate for this part of the country in 2015 was approximately 65%
higher than the rest of the country (Macy, 2018).
Oxycontin was originally created by a small family-owned pharmaceutical company
called Purdue Pharmaceutical, based in Stamford, CT. The pill was approved by the Food and
Drug administration in 1995, despite its potentially addictive qualities that were overlooked due
to the pain movement. Purdue Pharma’s pain specialist, Dr. J. David Haddox, made claims that
taking Oxycontin as prescribed puts the risk of addiction at one-half of one percent and that
iatrogenic (or doctor caused) addictions were very rare (Meier, 2003). However, there were
accounts of police lieutenants in Lee County already sounding alarms regarding opioid addiction
in 1997 (Macy, 2018). Only two years into its release, officials and police officers in the area
were beginning to see the death, pain, and devastation that Oxycontin could cause.
Now that many actors in the medical industry were encouraged to dispense opioids to any
patient experiencing serious pain, Purdue Pharma and other large pharmaceutical companies,
began seeing the large financial profit that could be gained from the sale of their opioid pills.
Between 1995 and 1998, drug advertising expenses increased from $360 million to $1.3 billion.
During this time, Purdue Pharma reps began visiting small rural Virginia towns and offering an
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overabundance of incentives to doctors who prescribed more OxyContin to their patients. In
2000, pharmaceutical companies spent $4.04 billion in direct marketing to doctors, a 64%
increase from 1996 (Macy, 2018). During an interview with a former Purdue Pharma sales
representative in January 2017, journalist Beth Macy accounts that the Purdue Pharma rep
claimed doctors were offered more incentives the higher the milligrams prescribed. In the
interview he also stated, “the doctors they incentivized were handpicked, based on certain
predictors such as patient volume and past prescribing history” (Macy, 2018). The efforts of
these companies led to local family doctors being the single largest group of prescribers during
this time (Tough, 2001). While sales representatives’ bonuses continued to grow, the population
was quickly becoming addicted to a substance that would lead to thousands of overdoses and
deaths.
As history repeated itself, there was a growing cause of concern for residents and medical
officials regarding the increasing distribution of Oxycontin. In 2001, a study was released that
was conducted by the Roanoke based medical examiner regarding Oxycontin overdose deaths.
The study found that in Roanoke in1997 Oxycontin was responsible for one death, the following
year it was responsible for three deaths, and the year after it was responsible for sixteen deaths
(Bowman, 2001). This study was not released until 2001, five years after the introduction of
Oxycontin, and after a massive number of people were already addicted. By this time, there were
43 overdose deaths for the region. As more people began realizing that opioids were responsible
for so many overdose deaths, some began to fight against opioids, with most of their cries going
unheard by the government and the companies who were profiting from prescribing the drug.
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The Legal Battle
Despite frustrations of being disregarded by so many agencies, doctors and other citizens
who agreed with their dispute against prescribing opioids so freely, continued to raise the issue
of Oxycontin. In 2001, the public began their legal fight with multiple different government
agencies and officials including the FDA and Purdue Pharma, attempting to reduce the
prescribing of the drug. In 2003, doctors and other members of the community – distraught by
what they were seeing – created a group called Relatives Against Purdue Pharma (RAPP). The
group worked to dig into the legalities of the distribution of Oxycontin. After a long wait, civil
charges were finally brought against the company in 2003 (Macy, 2018).
Criminal justice sectors also decided to bring criminal and civil charges against various
pharmaceutical companies that were responsible for so much harm. In 2006, the department of
justice brought criminal charges against Purdue Pharma. The company was accused of
undermining the risks of using opioids and misleading the health industry regarding the benefits
of using opioids to treat chronic pain. To the disappointment of the community, there were
minimal criminal charges brought against members of Purdue. The company was instead ordered
to pay severe fines – a total of $634.5 million – for misleading the public (Meier, 2019).
However, after the devastation and loss that thousands of wives, mothers, fathers, and friends
had experienced due to Oxycontin, the penalties that Purdue Pharma faced seem extremely
miniscule.
The battle against large pharmaceutical companies is still ongoing today. In 2019, some
states are continuing their fight against the company. Massachusetts has brought charges against
members of the Sackler family – members on the board of Purdue Pharmaceutical – accusing
them of putting patients on higher dosages of Oxycontin, knowing it increased the risk of serious
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side effects, such as addiction. The family profited directly from the sale of Oxycontin, and they
have been named one of the richest families in the country (Meier, 2019). The Massachusetts
attorney general estimated that from 2008 to 2016 the company profited over four billion dollars.
In March 2019, Purdue Pharma agreed to pay a $270 million-dollar settlement to the state
of Oklahoma for the damage caused by their company (Hill, 2019). There has been rumors of the
company filing for bankruptcy. Currently, more than 1,600 lawsuits in federal and state courts
have been brought against large pharma companies to place blame for the opioid epidemic. The
continuing legal fight against these companies reveals the country’s strong desire to receive
justice for the desolation the opioid crisis has caused.
Opioid Overprescribing Policies

After the case against Purdue Pharma, strict regulations were put on doctors and
pharmaceutical companies to prevent the overprescribing and misuse of opioids. The list of state
policies that have been implemented to limit the harm of opioid addiction is an extensive one.
Almost every state has adopted some type of policy or intervention that is intended to stop opioid
overprescribing. There are a few types of strategies that are used in opioid overprescribing;
1. Prescribing limits and guidelines: Restrictions based on the quantity of pills and/or
number of days prescribed.
2. Mandatory prescription monitoring: Regulations mandating the close monitoring of
persons receiving opioid prescriptions.
3. Standards of care: Offering the best care and treatment to patients suffering from opioid
use disorder.
4. Prescriber education: Mandates continuing education of doctors, nurses, physicians, and
any other medical workers who can prescribe opioids.
The implementation of these policies has led to a decline in opioid prescriptions across the nation
(Pryor, 2017). The policies imply that many state governments and agencies believe combating
overprescribing begins with the medical officials that are doing the prescribing.
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Opioid prescribing policies are intended to reduce harm and death caused by opioid
prescription pills and pharmaceutical companies. The logic behind these policies believes that
with a decrease in the prescribing of opioid pills, overdose deaths and addiction would also
decline. However, with a large portion of the US population already addicted to the drug, it was
estimated that in 2014 prescription opioids were still the direct cause of approximately 29,000
overdose deaths (Kahler et al., 2017). Unfortunately, not only have these policies failed in their
goal of reducing opioid abuse and overdoses, the implementation of these policies has had some
negative impacts on the opioid epidemic. These unintended consequences are essential to note
when discussing the history of the opioid epidemic. They play a key role in how the epidemic in
America has been shaped since the government recognized the damage opioids can cause.
Although the rate of opioid prescriptions drastically declined after the intervention,
opioid drug overdose deaths continued to climb severely (Pryor, 2017). Opioid addicted persons
who were once able to get their drug from a doctor found opioid prescriptions difficult to access
at the rate necessary to keep up with their addiction. To avoid withdrawal sickness, they were
forced to look for opioids elsewhere. Purchasing opioid prescription pills illegally can be
expensive and is more difficult since the implementation of stricter prescribing policies. In this
predicament, opioid abusers turned to something cheaper and more accessible – heroin and
fentanyl. When patients' access to opioids is stopped abruptly without support and treatment,
they are at high risk of replacing their supply with these illegal and dangerous street drugs
(Pryor, 2017).
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Heroin and Fentanyl
Scholars claim it was around 2010 that many opioid addicted users moved on to
intravenously injecting heroin. Heroin related overdose deaths peaked at this time. From 2002 to
2013, deaths from heroin increased by 286% (Lui, Pei, & Soto, 2018). Although heroin has been
on the market in the US for many years, the demand for the drug increased after the decline in
opioid prescriptions. Drug markets throughout the United States began profiting from heroin
sales, realizing how many people were already addicted to opioids and willing to be customers.
However, the worse of the opioid epidemic did not come until the deadly combination of heroin
and fentanyl became popular (Lui, Pei, & Soto, 2018).
Fentanyl was first developed in 1960 as a powerful painkiller and surgery anesthetic
without the side effect of nausea. It is prescribed in controlled settings for the most serious
conditions, such as to treat cancer pain, and usually dispensed in patches or lollipops (Dibble &
Davis, 2018). The drug is 25 to 50 times more potent than heroin (Lui, Pei, & Soto, 2018). Drug
cartels quickly found a way to process the drug cut into heroin, creating a lethal mixture. Heroin
began being cut with so much fentanyl that some people who were buying heroin were really
buying pure fentanyl. The deaths caused by fentanyl laced heroin did not deter addicts from
purchasing the drug. In fact, the increased high fentanyl gives draws them closer to it (Macy,
2018).
There has been a drastic increase in overdose deaths since the introduction of fentanyl in
heroin. The potency of the drug is dangerous, and it has clearly contributed to a larger proportion
of overdoses in the US. In 2015, it was involved in nearly 50% of opioid-related deaths, up from
14% in 2010 (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2019). The following year, synthetic opioids
(primarily illegal fentanyl) passed prescription opioid pills as the most common drug involved in
15

overdose deaths in the United States. In 2017, fentanyl laced heroin became the leading cause of
deaths for adults under the age of 50, killing more citizens than guns and car accidents, at a rate
higher than the HIV epidemic at its peak (Katz, 2017). The implications of these statistics are
grim and show the rapid increase and severity of overdoses since the introduction of fentanyl.
This deadly drug has seemingly secured an epidemic that has drastically shifted the country’s
future.

Conclusion
The events described in this paper are only a summary of the turmoil and loss that
the opioid epidemic has caused this country. To comprehend the opioid epidemic in the United
States it is essential to fully uncover the history of opioids. The incidents that led up to the opioid
crisis are important to understand when attempting to create interventions to combat opioid drug
overdoses. An issue that began as overprescribing opioid pills by doctors and physicians, quickly
escalated to thousands of people addicted to synthetic opioids and heroin now turning to drug
markets to feed their addiction. Many government officials, criminal justice officials, and
citizens have placed blame for the crisis on pharmaceutical companies, like Purdue Pharma. It is
their hope that with each intervention geared toward combating the opioid epidemic, we will
begin to see a decrease in the drug overdose deaths in the US. The fight against the opioid
epidemic continues to the present day, with thousands of citizens still battling opioid addiction.
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“Government Responses to the Opioid Epidemic”
Working Paper II
Abigail Hallowell
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Introduction
The United States government declared the opioid epidemic a public health emergency in
2017. The same year, drug overdose deaths claimed over 72,000 American lives (Jones, 2018).
The increase in opioid overdoses are a cause for concern for nearly everyone in the country.
Having never experienced an epidemic so severe, government officials were forced to respond to
the public outcry and devastation that opioids have triggered. Federal and state government’s
responses range in tactics and strategies and may address different aspects of the epidemic. Some
interventions that have been implemented to fight the opioid problem may be more criminal
justice focused, while others may be geared towards a medical perspective. Analyzing the
theoretical background of each intervention will bring a deeper understanding of how the nation
is addressing the opioid epidemic.
Although responses to the epidemic can vary in nature, government agencies and officials
share similar goals – to stop the opioid epidemic. However, the strategies may serve to combat
different aspects of the epidemic. The purpose of this paper is to highlight responses that federal,
state, and local governments have used to tackle problems caused by the opioid crisis. To
provide an overview of types of responses, I have chosen to analyze three criminal justice
focused interventions and three medically focused interventions to compare their logic and
effectiveness. I will discuss each response in detail and my reasoning behind the choosing of
these six responses. Comparisons of the different responses used to fight opioids are extremely
important due to the seriousness of the epidemic. It is imperative that medical, criminal justice,
and public officials are implementing the best practices to ensure that these strategies are
successful in reducing opioid overdose deaths.
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Criminal Justice versus Medical Responses
To begin the discussion of the government’s responses to the opioid epidemic, explaining
in detail the differences between criminal justice focused responses and medically focused
responses is imperative to differentiate the theoretical backgrounds of each. Criminal justice
responses typically involve actors from the criminal justice system (i.e. police, prosecutors, etc.)
participating in the intervention. A response may also be considered criminal justice based if the
person is receiving a punitive sanction due to their involvement with opioids. However, with the
death toll from opioids continuing to climb every year, many criminal justice responses in the US
are now prioritizing public health and including some medical qualities within the response. The
criminal justice responses that will be examined in this paper are the prosecution of drug dealers
in fatal overdoses, the implementation of drug treatment courts, and policing initiatives and
interventions.
I chose to discuss the prosecution of drug dealers in fatal overdoses because it is perhaps
the most extreme criminal justice approach to combat the epidemic. This approach also directly
targets drug dealers and does not offer any treatment for opioid addicted persons. Drug treatment
courts were chosen for this paper because of their popularity. Drug courts have been used in the
US criminal justice system since 1989 to combat drug addicts entering in and out of prison.
However, this paper will analyze the effectiveness of drug treatment courts on opioid addicted
persons, because there may be differences in treating opioid addicted persons compared to
persons addicted to other illicit substances. Lastly, policing initiatives and interventions were
chosen for this paper to show the change in policing, from tough to more liberal, toward the
opioid epidemic. Literature shows that many policing initiatives now include treatment and
medical tactics toward those addicted to opioids.
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A medical response to the opioid epidemic can be defined as completely focused on
public health and may involve the use of medicines or other remedies to treat opioid addiction.
Medical interventions do not seek to punish for opioid addiction, but rather assist opioid addicted
persons rehabilitation and treatment (Phillips, Ford, & Bonnie, 2017). Their strategies are harmreducing and wish to prevent deaths, addiction, and diseases that occur as a result of the opioid
crisis. The examples of medical responses that will be highlighted below are Medically Assisted
Treatment (MAT), the use of Naloxone/Narcan, and the implementation of opioid prescribing
policies.
The medical responses discussed in this paper were also each chosen for specific reasons.
MAT has been discussed in the literature to treat opioid use disorder by many different scholars
and has often had positive results. The success of this intervention in reducing opioid overdoses
is compelling and necessary to study. The use and distribution of Narcan in the United States is
perhaps the most popular response to combating opioid overdoses, and its popularity gives it
extreme importance to this paper. Finally, I chose to discuss opioid prescribing policies in this
paper because that was also a popular response by the US government. The intervention may
have also had unintended consequences that contributed to the epidemic, which makes
discussing it in my paper essential.
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Medical Responses
Naloxone (Narcan) Policies

Naloxone was developed in the early 1960s as an opioid antagonist with fewer side
effects than other drugs offered before its creation. Administration of the drug can temporarily
reverse the potentially deadly effects of an opioid overdose. The distribution and use of Narcan is
a harm-reducing medical strategy meant that targets opioids overdose deaths. Naloxone is
approved for administration by a variety of routes, including intravenous (IV), intramuscular
(IM), subcutaneous (SQ) and intranasal (IN), but is also administered via inhalation following
nebulization or endotracheal tube in intubated patients (Lynn & Galinkin, 2018).
Narcan is regulated by the FDA and in 2014 they approved the use of Narcan in an opioid
emergency for the general public. Thirty-six states in the U.S. have approved the distribution of
Narcan kits to members of the community without having a prescription (Pryor, 2017). It is now
completely legal throughout the US. Opioid related overdose numbers have been so drastic, the
government has been extremely lenient in their policies surrounding Narcan. Their hope is that
by making access to Narcan easier, more people will have it available to use during an opioid
overdose emergency, decreasing the number of fatal overdoses in the country. Products recently
approved by the FDA for administration by non-medical bystanders include an intramuscular
autoinjector, Evzio, approved in April 2014, and a spray device for intranasal delivery, approved
in November 2015 (Lynn & Galinkin, 2018). Narcan is easy to use and there are in person and
online trainings that are offered to any member of the public.
As mentioned earlier, Narcan may be the most common intervention used across the US
to combat the opioid crisis. A study conducted by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) found that from 2012 to 2016, an increase occurred in the number of EMS events with
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naloxone administration. During these years, the rate of naloxone administration events overall
increased 75.1%, from 573.6 to 1,004.4 administrations per 100,000 EMS events, and the rate of
naloxone administration in suspected overdoses increased 119.0%, from 230.6 to 505.2 (Cash et
al., 2018).
There have been studies conducted surrounding the impacts of Narcan distribution on
opioid overdose mortality rates. A study done in Massachusetts evaluated the impact of state
supported overdose education and nasal naloxone distribution (OEND) programs on rates of
opioid related death from overdose and acute care utilization. The study used an interrupted time
series analysis to measure the results. Researchers found a statistically significant reduction in
opioid related death rates after the OEND program was implemented and Narcan began being
used in communities (Walley et al., 2013). Another study conducted in 2011 found that overdose
death rates fell from 46.6 per 100,000 to 29.0 per 100,000 in the year following the introduction
of an overdose-prevention program that included the distribution of naloxone to community
members (Albert et al., 2011).
The cost of Narcan kits can range depending on medical coverage of the individual or
agency. They are typically sold in drug stores for approximately $130. However, EVZIO kits are
sold at $178 per carton (two auto-injectors per carton, $89 per dose) for government agencies,
first responders, health departments, and other qualifying groups. Narcan has a shelf life of
approximately 18 to 24 months, so it can be saved for future use in case of an overdose
emergency. Even after the drug expires, experts state it should still be used in case of a fatal
overdose if there are no other options (Pirani, 2017). This is a limit to how much help Narcan can
provide for combating the opioid crisis. Because the kits are expensive, they may be difficult for
addicted persons to retrieve. Also, heavy users may need to have Narcan administered more than
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once in their lifetime, therefore people will need more than one kit. The cost of Narcan is a
critique of the policies regarding it, especially in the United States where citizens don’t have
access to universal health care (Pirani, 2017). The availability of Narcan kits in case of an opioid
overdose is an issue that public health agencies recognize and are attempting to solve.
Another limitation encountered with Narcan is the lack of scientific information available
on its side effects, especially among people who have drug administered repeatedly. As the
number of naloxone products intended for use in such non-medical settings grows, so too does
concern about appropriate dosing of this medication to ensure the reversal of life-threatening
opioid overdoses while minimizing the risk of adverse effects of Narcan. There is also a concern
about using Narcan on pregnant women and children because Narcan does not provide a label on
how or if they should use the drug during an overdose situation.
Although most government agencies claim there are no significant side effects of Narcan,
some scholars argue that the dosage of Narcan given in an overdose situation matters. People
suffering from opioid use disorder often experience opioid-induced respiratory depression. Some
studies have claimed that high doses of Narcan can have potentially dangerous side effects on
respiratory depression, causing the person to experience cardiac arrest (Lynn & Galinkin, 2018).
Despite these challenges, in 2015 the American Association of Poison Control Centers reported
no fatalities due to naloxone other than buprenorphine/naloxone combinations (Lynn & Galinkin,
2018). The benefits of Narcan to the community are imperative and seem to outweigh these
limitations. The overdose reversal the drug executes is viewed as lifesaving.
Medically Assisted Treatment (MAT)

Medically assisted treatment (MAT) is the use of medication, usually combined with
behavioral therapy or counseling, to treat opioid use disorders. In 2016, the federal government
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passed the Substance Use Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for
Patients and Communities (SUPPORT) Act. The Act made several amendments to the
Controlled Substances Act, allowing practitioners greater flexibility in the provision of medically
assisted treatment (SAMHSA, 2019). Implementing MAT on state and local levels has proven
difficult due to the lack of physicians that are permitted to prescribe the medications needed for
MAT. Also, because MAT uses prescription medications like methadone, suboxone, and
naltrexone to treat opioid use disorder (OUD), the public has mixed feelings on supporting it.
Irrespective of the public opinion on MAT, there is literature supporting its effectiveness
in reducing harm associated with the opioid crisis. Due to the abundance of empirical studies that
have found this medical intervention is successful, scholars claim MAT is the central component
of evidence-based treatment for opioid use disorder, regardless of whether it is combined with
behavioral therapy (Knudsen, 2015). A randomized clinical trial conducted between 2009 and
2013 found that participants in the medication assisted treatment group were significantly more
likely to continue engaging in treatment and had significantly reduced days of self-reported illicit
opioid use per week (Donofrio et al., 2015). Other studies have found similar results, in addition
to findings of reduced risks of infectious-disease transmission and of engagement in criminal
activities (Volkow et al., 2014).
The positive impacts of MAT have been recognized by different government agencies,
resulting in the implementation of MAT in some jails and prisons to treat offenders suffering
from OUD. This tactic is not extremely common, but there is some literature on it. A study
conducted in Baltimore evaluated the long-term impacts that MAT had on offenders 12 months
post-release. The study found that there was a statistically significant difference in the likelihood
of relapsing among participants who received methadone treatment and patients who did not. It
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also showed that prison-initiated methadone maintenance treatment was associated with greater
duration of treatment in the community during the 12 months post prison release compared to
counseling in prison with passive referral at release or counseling in prison with initiation of
methadone treatment admission upon release (Kinlock, et al., 2009). This finding implies support
to some researcher’s argument discussed above – that MAT is the central component of
evidence-based treatment for OUD, with or without therapy.
Despite empirical support of the effectiveness of MAT, the intervention has several
limitations. In 2018, the Committee on Medication-Assisted Treatment for Opioid Use Disorder
created an ad hoc committee of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
to conduct a study of the evidence base on MAT for OUD. Specifically, the committee was
asked to identify barriers to the successful implementation of the intervention. The committee
found there were barriers with education, training, government policy, and healthcare delivery –
creating a lack of access to MAT and providers qualified to give it. They also found barriers with
a lack of knowledge on the effectiveness of MAT and the range of parameters and circumstances
in which it can be effectively delivered (i.e. duration of treatment, populations, settings, etc.)
(National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018). This implies the limitations
of MAT are not insignificant and should be continued to be reviewed by scholars and public
officials.
Opioid Prescribing Policies

The final medical response to examine, opioid prescribing policies, is an intervention
where government officials implement policies that regulate pharmaceutical companies and
physicians from continuing a pattern of overprescribing. Between 1999 and 2010, there was a
300% increase in the prescription of opioids in the United States (Kahler et al., 2017). In 2016,
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health care providers across the US wrote more than 214 million prescriptions for opioid pain
medication—a rate of 66.5 prescriptions per 100 people. According to the Center for Disease and
Control Prevention (CDC), the total economic burden of prescription opioid misuse in the US is
$78.5 billion a year, including the costs of health care, lost productivity, addiction treatment, and
criminal justice involvement (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018).
A study done between 2006 and 2015 measured the characteristics of a patients first
opioid prescription and its long-term impacts. Using a random sample, medical records were
selected from the IMS Lifelink+ database of patients 18 years or older who had at least one
opioid prescription during June 2006 and September 2015, and 6 months or more of continuous
enrollment without an opioid prescription before their first opioid prescription. The study found
that the likelihood of long-term use increasing sharply after the third and fifth days of taking a
prescription and spiking again after the 31st day (Shah, Hayes, & Martin, 2017). The following
graph represents data on a 1-year probability and a 3-year probability percentage of continued
use of opioids after the days first supply of opioid prescriptions;

*Source: (Shah, Hayes, & Martin, 2017)
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The chart shows the probability of opioid use continuing after the first use significantly
increases. The information in the chart implies that it is easy to get addicted to opioids after your
first use. It also provides a solid logic to the government’s decision to respond to the opioid
epidemic with prescribing policies. By decreasing the number of people who ever take an opioid
prescription, governments have restricted opioid prescribing and regulated those who currently
possess an opioid prescription. Despite the solid logic behind these policies, scholars claim
opioid prescribing policies only impact potential new opioid prescription users and do not help
the population of people currently suffering from opioid addiction (Phillips, Ford, & Bonnie,
2017).
Opioid prescribing policies vary based on state. Each state has implemented their own
laws and regulations surrounding the prescriptions of opioid pills. Although the policies differ
from state to state, they are all primarily based around five main strategies. I have created the
following table to illustrate the different types of prescribing policies and what they consist of
(Shah, Hayes, & Martin, 2017);
Types of Opioid Prescribing Policies

1. Prescribing limits and
guidelines
2. Mandatory prescription
monitoring
3. Standards of care

Restrictions based on the quantity of pills and/or number of
days prescribed.

4. Prescriber education

Regulations mandating the continued education of doctors,
nurses, physicians, and any other medical workers who can
prescribe opioids.

5. Expanded access to treatment

Overcoming barriers to securing insurance coverage to all
persons in need of opioid use disorder treatment.

Regulations mandating the close monitoring of persons
receiving opioid prescriptions.
Pushing medical practitioners to offer the best care and
treatment to patients suffering from opioid use disorder.
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These types of policies are based on three categories of prescribing policies; 1.) diversion before
a prescription has been filled, 2.) diversion during the filling of a prescription, and 3.) diversion
after a prescription has been filled (Phillips, Ford, & Bonnie 2017).
States have adopted several policies that fall into one of these categories. As of 2017, 49
states have adopted mandatory prescription drug monitoring programs (diversion after a
prescription has been filled), 19 states set day prescribed limits for written opioid prescriptions
(diversion during the filling of a prescription), 34 states mandate substance abuse disorder
assessments prior to receiving any opioid prescription (diversion before a prescription has been
filled), 23 states mandate continuing medical education for any providers who can prescribe
opioids (diversion before a prescription has been filled), and 13 states have set limits on opioid
prescribing diversion before a prescription has been filled (Pryor, 2017). These are only a few
examples of the long list of new regulations on prescribing.
In May 2016, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker signed a comprehensive bill that
addressed education, intervention, and prevention on opioid abuse. In this bill, a strict limitation
law on opioid prescriptions was enacted and opioid prescriptions in the state took a downward
turn with a 16% decline in number of patients receiving opioid prescriptions (Pryor, 2017). This
would imply success of the intervention, but we must be skeptical of this knowing prescribing
policies do not have an impact on high-risk populations currently already addicted to opioid
substances. Mandatory prescription drug monitoring programs may be more useful in combating
the epidemic because they screen patients for previous opioid prescription abuse before allowing
them to be further prescribed (Pryor, 2017).
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Criminal Justice Responses
Prosecuting Opioid Dealers for Homicide

The United States federal law has included a penalty of 20 years to life in prison for
providing drugs that cause fatal overdoses since Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986 (Collins, 2019). Gaining more popularity among criminal justice officials in recent years,
the prosecution of drug dealers for homicide in fatal opioid overdoses has been used as a
response to the opioid epidemic by many state governments (Neil, 2019). A significant number
of states count drug offenses within their murder statutes and, while the laws have been around
for a long time, they are only now being considered in opioid overdose cases in response to the
epidemic (Neil, 2019). There has been a push to be “tough on dealers” throughout the country
and law makers and prosecutors have been directed to do so. Twenty states now have “druginduced homicide” laws that carry the same sentences as murder and manslaughter (Collins,
2019). Thirty-six states have now successfully prosecuted opioid overdose cases, with charges
ranging from involuntary manslaughter to first-degree murder (Goldensohn, 2018).
Prosecuting opioid dealers in fatal overdose cases uses a general deterrence approach to
combat the illegal sale of opioid substances. The deterrence theory argues that the more severe,
certain, and swift a punishment, the more likely a rationally calculating human being will abstain
from criminal acts. General deterrence suggests that the general population will be deterred from
offending when they are aware of others being apprehended (Tomlinson, 2016). This criminal
justice approach uses general deterrence by giving severe punishments to opioid dealers to deter
other dealers from continuing to engage in their criminal behavior. Criminal justice officials
hope that by increasing these convictions, opioid dealers will see how much prison time they can
receive for what they are doing. These cases are often covered in the media to get the message
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out to drug dealers. From 2011 to 2016, the number of news stories about people charged with or
prosecuted for drug-induced homicides increased from 363 to 1,178 – more than a 300%
increase (Collins, 2019).
This strategy has many limitations. First, it is often difficult for prosecutors to reach
convictions in these cases. According to the National Association of Attorneys General, when
attempting to prosecute someone for a homicide, causation of death must be determined. With
many outside circumstances existing, it becomes difficult for a prosecutor to prove causation of
death was due to the illicit substance the person used (Neil, 2019). Also, despite its rising
popularity in the legal system, studies suggest that this intervention is not effective, and there is
little evidence that publicizing lengthy prison terms will make dealers think twice about
continuing to sell opioids (Siegel & Beletsky, 2018).
Along with these limitations, many law makers believe this tactic is unfair and has
unintended consequences. Tough prosecution strategies may discourage people from calling 911
to help overdose victims and may fuel higher arrest rates for people who are not dealing opioid
substances. Instead of targeting drug dealers, charges are often being brought against family
members or friends who shared illegal opioids with the deceased (Goldensohn, 2018). The
unintended consequences mentioned are not insignificant and imply that this policy needs to be
examined further to determine its impacts on the opioid epidemic.
Drug Treatment Courts

Drug treatment courts can be defined as a program within the judicial system that deals
with nonviolent criminal cases involving drug users (“A Comprehensive Guide to Drug Courts”,
2017). Although specialty drug treatment courts are known to focus on rehabilitation of the
offender, using drug courts as an intervention to combat opioids can be considered a criminal
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justice response. State and local criminal justice agencies continue to use drug courts to fight
against opioid addiction, despite conflicting literature on their effectiveness.
In a study done by the Urban Institute, a 6-year national evaluation of multi-site adult
drug courts was conducted to evaluate their effectiveness. The study included 23 adult drug
courts all located in different geographic locations throughout the US. Though the study was not
a randomized control trial, researchers performed a quasi-experimental method using self-report
survey data, field visits, administrative records, and oral fluid tests. Researchers conducted a 6month and 18-month follow-up with participants to achieve accurate results (Rempel, 2012).
The study found that at the 6-month follow-up, 40% of drug court participants compared
with 55% of comparison offenders self-reported that they had used at least one of eight measured
substances. This was a significant difference. However, there was no significant difference in the
percentage of drug court and comparison offenders self-reporting serious drug use (32% versus
40%). By the 18-month follow-up, drug court participants reported significantly fewer
occurrences of any drug use (56% versus 76%), serious drug use (41% versus 58%), days of use
per month (2.1 days versus 4.8 days) and days of serious use per month (1.1 days versus 2.3
days). Also at the 18-month follow-up, the oral swab tests administered determined that drug
court participants had a significantly lower rate of testing positive than the comparison offenders
(29% versus 46%). Unfortunately, when examining specific drugs that were tested, there were no
significant differences between the groups in the rates of positive drug tests for marijuana,
cocaine, opiates, or amphetamines (Rempel, 2012).
There are some implications from the findings of this study that must be considered when
evaluating the impact of drug courts on the opioid epidemic. Based on these results, it appears
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that drug courts are effective in reducing the likelihood of using drugs after completing the drug
court. However, after time there were no significant differences among drug use for opiates.
Opioid addiction and withdrawal may be described by some as more severe than that of other
drugs and the number of overdoses from opioids is higher than any other drug the country has
seen. The results of the study imply that changes in drug treatment courts may be necessary to
increase their effectiveness in combating the opioid epidemic.
To more effectively combat the epidemic, these changes in drug courts are already
beginning to be made in drug courts throughout the country. For example, in 2017, a new
specialty drug treatment court was introduced in Buffalo, NY that is tailored specifically to
offenders suffering from OUD. The Buffalo Opioid Intervention Court, run by Judge Craig
Hannah, uses different tactics including MAT and behavior counseling to offer the best treatment
possible. The court has received positive feedback from the community and its model is already
being replicated in other courts (Viera, 2019).
Policing Interventions and Initiatives

To combat the opioid epidemic, many law enforcement agencies in the US have
implemented different policing initiatives to attempt to decrease opioid related overdoses. Some
commonly used interventions by police agencies to fight the opioid crisis include problemoriented policing (POP), community-based policing, and police assisted recovery initiatives.
These policing initiatives have similar qualities, but each initiative uses different strategies in
tackling the epidemic.
Community-based policing involves a strong partnership between local law enforcement
and the community they serve. Community policing initiatives operate on the belief that a better
relationship with the community will decrease crime problems in that neighborhood.
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Community-based policing initiatives may involve police walking on foot in neighborhoods,
getting to know the residents, treating residents with respect and kindness, making their presence
known in any local stores or businesses, and being present in any community building tasks the
neighborhoods may be participating in. By being more thoughtful and innovative in dealing with
neighborhood issues, police can gain trust and be more effective in their policing (Clear,
Hamilton, & Cadora, 2011). Because many communities have been directly impacted by the
opioid epidemic, many community-based policing initiatives are being created to work with
residents on combating these issues.
There have been positive findings regarding the implementation of community policing
initiatives. A community policing pilot project that started in 1993 in Chicago was evaluated
after two years. The findings were very encouraging. It was found that perceived crime problems
had decreased significantly, robbery and auto theft declined, residents had more positive attitudes
towards the police and police supervisors involved in the study were more optimistic than their
counterparts about the impact of community policing (US National Institute of Justice, 1995).
Problem-oriented policing initiatives collaborate with government and non-profit
agencies to fight opioid riddled neighborhoods (Corsaro & McGarrell, 2014). Problem-oriented
policing targets illegal drug markets and problem offenders. There are several tactics POP
utilizes to uncover illegal opioid drug markets. First, officers may use field investigations and
data analysis to discover hot-spot area and problem offenders. Once target areas and high-risk
offenders are identified, law enforcement can use focused deterrence to combat the drug market
(Altheimer et al., 2019). Problem oriented policing also uses opportunity reduction in the
physical environment to disturb operating drug markets. The goal of POP is not to just arrest
offenders, but to disrupt the mechanisms of the market’s survival (Harocopos & Hough, 2005).
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Studies exist that have examined the effectiveness of POP initiatives and found positive
results. In High Point, NC, researchers conducted a study on a POP initiative called the High
Point Drug Market Intervention. The neighborhood the intervention targeted had crime problems
directly associated with a known drug market operating in the community. Researchers found
that the intervention had a statistically significant impact on reducing violent incidents in the
target areas. Targeted census blocks (treatment group) experienced a 7.9 percent decrease in
violence, while the comparison blocks experienced a 7.8 percent increase in violence
(McGarrell, 2014).
Another policing initiative that is geared toward helping persons suffering from OUD is
police assisted recovery initiatives. This intervention has been implemented to provide other
options for opioid addicted offenders besides arrest. The purpose of these programs is to reduce
unnecessary justice system involvement and instead give them assistance finding treatment
(Nyrop, 2019). Police diversion interventions allow officers to use their discretion when
encountering persons with unmet opioid abuse needs. They can then use outreach strategies to
assist the person in connecting with an appropriate treatment agency (Nyrop, 2019). The opioid
epidemic prompted the onset of these new recovery-based police initiatives due to the public
harm it has created. Although literature on this initiative is sparse due to its recent invention, law
enforcement agencies are confident in its harm-reducing tactics to deal with the epidemic.

Funding of Reponses
Now that several responses to the opioid epidemic have been identified, it is helpful to
analyze government funding for these interventions to understand how the US has spent taxpayer
money on these responses. A large amount of money has been spent on interventions to stop the
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opioid epidemic. To analyze the distribution of this money, the Bipartisan Policy Center has
broken down funding by department and type of response. I will examine government funding
on the opioid epidemic for the most recent year, 2018. The following chart lists the different
government departments that were awarded funding from the federal government for the opioid
crisis in 2018;
Department
Health and Human Services

Amount
$5,521,368,000

Office of National Drug Control Policy
Department of Justice
Veterans Affairs
Homeland Security
Department of Labor
Total Opioid Spending 2018

$3,685,479,000
$6,000,000
$630,579,000
$480,000,000
$125,310,000
$500,000,000
$94,000,000
$379,000,000
$515,839,484
$704,552,000
$261,100,000
$21,000,000
$7,402,859,484

Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration
Indian Health Service
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Health Resources and Services Administration
Administration for children and families
National Institutes of Health
Food and Drug Administration

*Source (The Bipartisan Policy Center)

These agencies all serve to address the opioid epidemic differently. For example, Health and
Human Services may be distributing their funds to programs that are more medically focused,
while the Department of Justice may utilize their funds on a criminal justice focused
intervention. I created the following two charts to illustrate how these funds were spent in 2018,
organized by the type of response;
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Type of Response

Amount

Treatment and Recovery

$2,115,574,000

Prevention

$1,684,442,800

Treatment/Recovery & Prevention

$1,903,103,200

Research
Criminal Justice

$500,000,000
$532,639,484

Law Enforcement
Interdiction

$312,000,000
$355,100,000

Law Enforcement Interdiction
5%
4%
Criminal Justice
7%

Treatment and
Recovery
28%

Research
7%

Treatment/Recovery
and Prevention
26%

Prevention
23%

*Source (The Bipartisan Policy Center)

The charts show that the most funding the United States government distributes is for
programs involving treatment, prevention, or both. Despite the growing number of criminal
justice-based responses, they are not funded as much as expected by the federal government.
However, it is necessary to keep in mind that programs like drug treatment court and policebased initiatives that focus on treatment, may be included under the “treatment and recovery”
section of these charts. The increased spending on treatment implies the government’s
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recognition of opioid use disorder as a disease that requires appropriate care. The high spending
on prevention implies the government’s recognition of the severity of opioid-related overdoses.

Implications
The long and varying list of responses that the US government has implemented to deal
with the opioid epidemic show the disorganization and uncertainty of the law makers
surrounding the topic. The opioid epidemic is a massive problem spread across the entire nation,
and the implications of this paper show that government officials are unsure what is the best way
to stop opioid overdose deaths. There is a lack of knowledge and understanding around what
interventions are successful in combating the opioid crisis. This lack of understanding suggests
that the opioid epidemic may be progressing because our government has not implemented
responses that are proven to work.
Scholars have critiqued government interventions by stating that the unique dynamics of
opioid misuse – both in the medical industry and in the illegal markets – requires a ‘systems’
approach that integrates multiple government sectors (i.e. criminal justice & medical) to address
the epidemic (Phillips, Ford, & Bonnie, 2017). This systems approach may stop the divide that
we see in government interventions currently. As described in some of the responses above,
government agencies are beginning to collaborate more often when implementing interventions
to stop the opioid emergency. For example, drug treatment courts beginning to address offenders
with OUD and offer them treatment options such as MAT. This collaboration between treatment
officials, medical officials, and criminal justice officials may be key in finding interventions that
are completely effective in reducing opioid overdoses. The research in this paper implies that a
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mix between the criminal justice and medical field is necessary when making interventions to
combat the opioid crisis.

Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to describe how federal, state, and local governments have
reacted to the devastation that opioids have cause the country. The interventions that were
discussed range from being either medically focused or criminal justice focused. Each response
examined is unique and was implemented to put a dent in opioid overdoses. There are multiple
criminal justice approaches and medical approaches that are being used simultaneously to fight
the opioid epidemic. Knowing which interventions are more successful and reduce the most
harm is critical. More empirical evaluations on these interventions are necessary to determine the
effectiveness of each. While there are mixed views on which is approach most beneficial to
combat opioids, both types of interventions are constantly being created and implemented across
the country without scientific certainty of success. The importance of this issue should be
emphasized because the country is still experiencing the negative impacts from the opioid
epidemic today.
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Introduction
The opioid epidemic was responsible for over 72,000 opioid drug overdose deaths in
2017 (Jones, 2018). Because of the severity of the epidemic, policy makers have been forced to
enact strategic legal policies, practices, and laws, to attempt to combat the opioid crisis. The
criminal justice system and the public health system have worked together in ways to create
policies that will curb the high number of opioid deaths. By addressing the epidemic from both
criminal justice perspectives and medical perspectives, there may be conflicting opinions and
which tactic will best solve the crisis. However, criminal justice sectors and public health sectors
in Monroe County have both participated in creating interventions that aim to address the
epidemic.
To analyze what is being done in Monroe County, NY surrounding the opioid epidemic I
will focus on different interventions that have been implemented in recent years. Public officials
and agencies in the county are currently addressing the opioid epidemic with different strategies
that aim to decrease problems directly caused by opioids. The purpose of this paper is to provide
an overview of these interventions and discuss the strategies the intervention uses to help combat
opioid overdoses in Monroe County. Though Monroe County has implemented several
interventions to fight opioids, I will focus on three responses in this paper. The three responses
are the Monroe County Heroin Task Force, Project CLEAN, and the implementation of
Medically Assisted Treatment (MAT) at the Monroe County Jail (MCJ). Each response has
different qualities, and one may have more impacts than the others. Thus, it is important to study
the responses offered in Monroe County to attempt to determine the best practices in battling the
opioid epidemic.
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Importance of Opioids in Monroe County
The opioid epidemic has drastically impacted different states and counties throughout the
US. For the purpose of this paper, it is important to show the severity of the opioid crisis in New
York State and specifically, Monroe County. In New York State, there was a 71% increase in
drug overdose deaths from 2010 to 2015. Using provisional NYS Department of Health Data, a
study conducted found a 54% increase in heroin deaths, a 50% increase in emergency room visits
due to heroin overdoses, and a 45% increase in the use of life-saving overdose medication, like
Naloxone, in one year alone (2014-2015). From 2015 to 2016, drug deaths increased 29 percent
— from 3,009 total deaths to 3,894 (Malatras, 2018).
Monroe County, NY has experienced similarly shocking statistics. The following chart
shows opioid overdoses in Monroe County over the last three years;
Table 1

Monroe County Fatal and Non-Fatal Opioid
Overdoses 2016-2018
1200
967

Overdoses

1000
800

662

600
400
200
0

260

145

82

2016 (n=342)

2017 (n=807)
Fatal

166

2018 (n=1,133)

Non-Fatal

*Graph created by Abigail Hallowell, Research Assistant with the Center for Public Safety Initiatives

In 2016, there were 82 fatal overdoses and 260 non-fatal overdoses. In 2017, the number
of fatal overdoses almost doubled (n=145), while non-fatal overdoses almost tripled (n=662). In
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2018, there was a slight increase for fatal overdoses from the previous year (n=145). The same
year, a similar pattern is reflected with non-fatal overdoses drastically increasing (n=967). The
high number of fatal and non-fatal overdoses shown in the graph reflect the prominence of
opioid abuse in Monroe County.
Monroe County also faces challenges in certain communities with illegal opioid drug
markets. A medium-sized city located in the center of the county, Rochester, NY is home to the
majority of all the overdoses in Monroe County. The following chart illustrates opioid overdoses
in Monroe County from January 2016 to April 2019 by the town or city the overdose occurred in.
Town
Brighton
Brockport
Chili
East Rochester
Fairport
Gates
Greece
Hamlin
Henrietta
Hilton
Honeoye Falls
Irondequoit
Ogden
Parma
Penfield
Perinton
Pittsford
Riga
Rochester
Rush
Scottsville
Sweden
Webster
Wheatland
Total

Overdoses
27
24
35
26
20
74
205
21
76
14
5
90
54
15
75
18
29
2
1,590
5
5
10
37
2
2,459
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As illustrated in the chart, over half of the overdoses that occurred during this timeframe
took place in the city of Rochester (n=1,590). Because many of these overdoses are from people
who do not reside in the city, it is assumed that they are coming in to the city to purchase illegal
opioid substances, ingesting them immediately, and thus overdosing within the city confines.
The operation of illegal opioid drug markets and the increasing number of overdoses in Monroe
County are a cause for concern. These issues have forced Monroe County officials to implement
several interventions discussed in detail below.

The Monroe County Heroin Task Force
The Monroe County Heroin Task Force, implemented in January 2018, is a collaboration
between the Monroe County Sheriff’s office, the Monroe County District Attorney’s office, the
Monroe County Public Safety Office, the Monroe County Public Health Commissioner, the
Rochester Police Department, Ogden Police Department, and the Gates Police Department.
These groups have partnered together to address the heroin crisis in Monroe County. I chose to
discuss this response because it is the largest and most prominent intervention that has been
implemented to combat the opioid epidemic in Monroe County. The intervention also has the
largest range of tactics used to combat the epidemic. They have implemented several strategies
that differ in nature but are each working toward the same goal – to decrease opioid related
overdoses.
Prosecuting Drug Dealers

The first strategy that the Monroe County Heroin Task Force has taken in fighting the
epidemic is attempting to prosecute persons who are responsible for the sale of illegal opioids
that cause fatal overdoses. This criminal justice aspect of addressing the problem focuses on
punishment and general deterrence to future dealers. The Heroin Task Force’s hope is that using
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this response will lessen the number of illicit opioid dealers and suppliers on the street. This
approach to stop the opioid epidemic is controversial across the country and it can be difficult to
reach convictions for these occurrences. Nonetheless, the Monroe County prosecutor Sandra
Doorely convicted a Rochester resident of criminally negligent homicide in 2018 when he sold a
man heroin that lead to a fatal overdose (Singer, 2018).
Because this strategy operates on a general deterrence theory approach, county officials
have made sure to publicize these convictions through the media and other outlets. After the
conviction, the police chief of a Monroe County town was quoted saying “If you're a drug dealer,
you're playing Russian Roulette. We will come after you, and I think this case shows that we are
serious about that." There have also been billboards put up throughout the county warning drug
dealers of this new tactic (Flasch, 2018). This strategy assumes that drug dealers are rational and
if they see other dealers receiving harsh sentences, they will be deterred from engaging in further
criminal activity. Unfortunately, studies suggest that this intervention is not effective, and there
is little evidence that publicizing lengthy prison terms will make dealers think twice about
continuing to sell opioids (Siegel & Beletsky, 2018).
Addressing Pharmaceutical Companies

Another strategy that the Monroe County Heroin Task Force has listed as an intervention
to combat the opioid epidemic is bringing charges against several pharmaceutical companies
responsible for overprescribing opioids. The Heroin Task Force has pursued charges against
large pharmaceutical companies such as Purdue Pharmaceuticals and Johnson & Johnson. These
companies may be responsible for a large portion of the Monroe County population – and US
population – that is addicted to opioids.
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In April 2019, federal authorities pressed charges against a pharmaceutical company
called the Rochester Drug Co-operative (RDC) that operates in Monroe County. The company is
one of the 10 largest pharmaceutical distributors in the US, recently earning an annual profit of
$2 billion. The RDC is responsible for driving up the sales of oxycodone pills drastically over
four years, from 4.7 million in 2012 to 42.2 million in 2016 (Rashbaum, 2019). Prosecutors
charged RDC as a corporate entity with conspiring to distribute drugs, conspiracy to defraud the
United States and failing to file suspicious order reports. This response to the Rochester
company is also publicized in the media and is used as a general deterrent strategy targeting
other large pharma companies. Pursuing pharmaceutical companies for their crimes may
decrease the number of opioids being prescribed, but it does not necessarily help opioid addicted
persons who are currently at-risk of overdosing.
Recovery and Treatment Focused Strategies

The Heroin Task Force uses other strategies to address the opioid crisis that may seem to
contradict the deterrence method that they use to address drug dealers and pharmaceutical
companies. The task force reinforces that they value treatment for addiction to prevent
overdoses. The Monroe County Heroin Task Force website highlights that they partner with
multiple non-profit agencies that provide outreach, counseling, and other resources committed to
combating addiction. Each of these organizations address different aspects of the opioid
epidemic within the community. For example, ROCovery Fitness and the Mission Recovery and
Hope, Inc. are two non-profit organizations that partner with the Task Force. Both organizations
base their program on abstinence and recovery from opioids. These interventions used by the
Task Force imply that they are also interested in taking a rehabilitative and treatment focused
approach in addressing the opioid epidemic.
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The Monroe County Chief Executive Cheryl Dinolfo, a member of the Heroin Task
Force, created an Opioid Action Plan to fight the opioid epidemic. The Action Plan provides a
list of treatment focused interventions that will be used in Monroe County to combat opioids
such as participating in community outreach, hiring more toxicologists, and collaborating with
public health agencies. It is worth noting that the Heroin Task Force and the Opioid Action Plan
in Monroe County utilize criminal justice, medical, and treatment focused responses to deal with
opioid overdoses.
Overdose Data Collection

Another tactic of the Opioid Action Plan is to coordinate overdose data in the county. An
issue encountered when attempting to study opioid overdoses in Monroe County is the lack of
accurately recorded data. The Task Force’s goal of coordinating data is to streamline and
centralize overdose data and overcome certain legal barriers that prevent them from retrieving
the data. It is important to remember that there are limitations to the data presented by these
agencies. Law enforcement, EMS workers, and the public safety community are responsible for
collecting accurate and detailed information when someone overdoses. The data is susceptible to
human error. Also, only recently did the precise collection of overdose data become a priority,
due to the recent realization of the severity of the opioid epidemic by the public and government
officials. Thus, overdoses that occurred before 2018 may have been recorded inaccurately or not
recorded at all.
To give an example of the county’s overdose data collection errors prior to 2018, there
are differences in the number of fatal and non-fatal overdoses recorded within different
government agencies for 2016 and 2017. The Monroe County Heroin Task Force and the Opioid
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Action Plan contain different data on their websites for number of overdoses and overdose
deaths. These discrepancies are illustrated in the following chart;
Monroe County Opioid Overdose Data
Comparisons 2016 -2017
600

546
467

Overdoses

500

467

400
300
200

169 159

220
126

160

100
0

2016 Fatal OD

2017 Fatal OD

Heroin Task Force

2016 Non-Fatal OD 2017 Non-Fatal OD

Opioid Action Plan

*Source (Monroe County Heroin Task Force, 2018) & (Monroe County Opioid Action Plan, 2018)

The Heroin Task force has recorded 766 overdoses and 220 fatal overdoses in 2017. This
data was retrieved from the Monroe County Medical Examiner’s Office. In comparison, the
Monroe County Opioid Overdose Data provided by the New York State Department of Health
Quarterly Opioid County Report reported only 126 fatal overdoses in Monroe County for 2017.
This disconnection in data within different sectors of the Monroe County government can be a
huge hurdle when addressing the issue of opioids.
The chart implies that there may be difficulty finding a standard and accurate way to
record data on opioid overdoses in Monroe County. It may also imply that the importance of
coordinating this data was not yet recognized by government agencies in the county. As stated
earlier, now that the epidemic has severely impacted Monroe County, the Task Force has
mandated the accurate tracking of opioid overdoses. By continuing to follow the Opioid Action
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Plan and tracking this data, officials in Monroe County may achieve a more precise
understanding of the opioid epidemic and be able to shape policies based on the data.
Narcan Use and Distribution

The final tactic implemented by the Monroe County Task Force to discuss in the
increased use and distribution of Narcan during an opioid overdose. When the Task Force was
created, it claimed that expanding training, education, and access to Narcan was a primary goal
of the intervention. As of October 2018, all officers in the Rochester Police Department are now
mandated to be trained on and always carry a Narcan kit. The use of Narcan in Monroe County
has become extremely popular during the event of an opioid overdose. The following graph
shows the administration of Narcan during opioid overdoses in Monroe County from January
2016 to April 2019;
ADMINISTRATION OF NARCAN DURING AN OPIOID
OVERDOSE IN MONROE COUNTY JAN 2016-APRIL 2019

28%
72%

Administered (n= 1,736)

Not Administered (n=679)

The chart shows that over a three-year period of opioid overdoses in Monroe County,
Narcan was administered in 72% of the time. This implies that the Task Force has been
successful in the implementation of expanding the use of Narcan in Monroe County.
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Project CLEAN
Project CLEAN is an intervention in Monroe County to combat the opioid epidemic
locally. It is part of a 3-year grant from the Department of Justice that is aimed at changing
communities facing specific crime problems. The project started in 2016 and the entire first year
was dedicated to planning. The second year of Project CLEAN began its Early Action Plan and
the third year was the implementation phase of the intervention (Dude-Banwar, 2018). I chose to
discuss Project CLEAN in this paper because its main purpose is to target the open-air drug
market currently operating in the city of Rochester. The program uses several unique strategies
that are important when discussing the opioid epidemic in Monroe County.
The project is a Community Based Crime Reduction (CBCR) model that utilizes a
collaborative approach with multiple organizations to disrupt the open-air drug market in the El
Camino neighborhood in Rochester. This neighborhood has been deemed the target area for
Project CLEAN due to the overwhelmingly high number of opioid overdoses and non-marijuana
drug arrests that have occurred there. The heat map below depicts drug arrests in the city of
Rochester from 2013 to 2017 (n=5633), with the target area outlined in black.
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. In 2017, there were 85 fatal overdoses in the El Camino neighborhood, a
disproportionately large number for the general Monroe County area (Duda-Banwar, 2018). This
small neighborhood has faced unique issues associated with the opioid epidemic. Project
CLEAN uses a Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) community-based approach to clean up the El
Camino neighborhood and reduce the negative impacts that the heroin market has on the
community wellbeing and residents (Duda-Banwar, 2018).
Project CLEAN created five strategy principals to guide the project, and each
intervention the project uses should generally fit into one of the strategies. I have created this
chart to list and discuss the five strategy principals;
Project CLEAN Five Strategy Principals
1. Strengthen/Support
Neighborhood Engagement
(Collective Efficacy)

-Create prosocial activities at hotspot locations.

2. Enhance Neighborhood and
System Accountability (Procedural
Justice)

-Interview residents to determine their needs.

3. Observe, Understand, and
Respond (Public Health and
Enforcement Surveillance)

-Reoccurring walking community engagement patrols with
two police officers.
-Utilize calls for service data and arrest data to discover
trends.

4. Improve the Built-Environment
(Revitalization)

-Clean up target area (i.e. drug paraphernalia, garbage).
-Reconstruct parks, abandoned buildings, and empty lots.
-Sobriety or inspection checkpoints on key routes to the TA.

5. Communicate and Connect

-Coordinate social and visual campaign
-Create service connections via direct street outreach in the
target area.

These strategy principals assisted in determining the project’s Early Action Plan that was
implemented in the second year. The Early Action Plan consisted of 9 different strategies that
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were implemented to combat the open-air drug market in the El Camino neighborhood. The
different tactics listed in the plan are;
1. Community Engagement Patrols: Law enforcement will engage with the community on
walking patrols and build relationships and conduct business checks and physical
disorder assessments.
2. Disorder Policing and Targeted Patrols in the Target Area: Focused deterrence strategy
also known as “hot-spot” policing, to deter dealers from selling opioids in public areas.
3. Inspection or Sobriety Checkpoints on Key Routes to the Target Area: Officers will begin
conducting frequent inspection and sobriety checkpoints near highways around the TA.
4. Establish CPTED Assessment Process: Follow plans to combat the drug market by
changing the surrounding environment to lessen the opportunity for drug sales and other
illegal behavior
5. Change Traffic Patterns: Modify infrastructure in TA to lessen the opportunity for so
much incoming and outgoing traffic.
6. Target Area Revitalization: Update public parks and empty lots, fix dilapidated buildings,
clean up needles, etc.
7. Create Prosocial Activities at Hotspot Locations: Engage the community in positive
activities in the TA to deter drug sales in the area and gain public support
8. Coordinated Social and Visual Campaign: ¡No Más! Campaign: Gain more public
support of changing the open-air drug market culture by renaming parks, engaging in
social media, etc.
9. Create Service Connections via Direct Street Outreach in the Target Area: Offer
treatment or other medical options for opioid addicted persons in the TA
These tactics are specific to the El Camino neighborhood, and the open-air opioid drug
market that operates within it (Duda-Banwar, 2018). Some examples of tactics Project CLEAN
has executed following the Early Action Plan are; community needle clean ups, Rochester Police
Department Community Engagement Patrols, revitalization of Don Samuel Torres Park, and
conduct interviews with residents of the neighborhood.
Literature on Similar Interventions

There are numerous studies that have been conducted on community-based crime
reduction interventions. When reviewing the current literature on this topic, studies that focus on
programs that are comparable to Project CLEAN are sparse, likely because the program is so
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uniquely tailored to the El Camino neighborhood in Rochester. However, the implications of
some previous studies may help us formulate predictions on the effectiveness of Project CLEAN.
One study worth discussing analyzes the effectiveness of a Community Based Crime
Prevention Reduction program, Eisenhower Foundation's Neighborhood Program, in ten
communities that face unique crime problems, like the El Camino neighborhood in Rochester.
The authors highlight two issues with using a CBCR program in these communities. First,
residents of high-crime communities are less likely than residents of low-crime communities to
participate in community crime prevention programs. Second, typical community crime
prevention strategies (i.e. neighborhood watch programs) seem to be typically less effective in
such communities (Bennett and Lavrakas, 1989).
The study includes both a process and impact evaluation of the Eisenhower Foundation's
Neighborhood Program. For the process evaluation, the primary source of data was retrieved
from in-person interviews with staff members, police officers, volunteers, local merchants,
council members, and community residents. These interviews along with frequent visits to the
sites, quarterly reports from the sites, and reviewing other files. For the impact evaluation of the
program, a quasi-experimental pretest-posttest with a nonequivalent control group was used. The
researchers assessed the programs impact on resident’s community activities, crime prevention
activities and attitudes, perceptions of local problems, fear of crime, victimization experiences,
and the community’s quality of life. After determining problems areas, researchers conducted
500 telephone interviews with residents (65% of respondents lived within the target areas) and
analyzed monthly crime statistics from 1981 through 1985 (Bennett and Lavrakas, 1989).
Despite successful implementation of the program, the general findings in the study show
a lack of success in achieving the ultimate goals of crime reduction and improving neighborhood
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quality of life. The level and consistency of positive community changes that can be documented
were lower than anticipated. However, they stated that these findings may be a result of
limitations to their study such as lack of funding for the program, the communities limited
resource base, the magnitude of problems in these high-crime areas, and difficulties in
documenting change produced by a community program and limitations to the evaluation
(Bennett and Lavrakas, 1989).
The findings appear grim for CBCR programs. The limitations with the program that the
authors describe are ones that any CBCR intervention may face when trying to help communities
with these unique crime issues. Based on the implications of the findings, Project CLEAN may
face similar failures as the Eisenhower Foundation's Neighborhood Program. However, the
authors mention that a successful CBCR intervention should be tailored to the needs of that
community. As discussed earlier, Project CLEAN has successfully personalized its interventions
to meet the specific needs of the El Camino neighborhood and its residents.
Another study important to analyze when predicting outcomes for Project CLEAN was
published in the Campbell Collaboration in 2012. The experiment analyzed 10 randomized
control trials on hot-spot and problem-oriented policing interventions. The study found a
significant small overall mean effect (n=0.116) in favor of hot spots policing. This implies hot
spots policing strategies have a modest effect on reducing crime. However, it also found that
problem-oriented policing approaches produced a larger overall mean effect size (n=0.232) that
was twice that of the overall mean effect size for traditional policing approaches (Braga, 2012).
The results imply that when combining hot-spot policing with problem-oriented policing, like
Project CLEAN does, larger crime reductions effects are more likely. Unlike the previous study,
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the findings in this study suggest that Project CLEAN may be effective in combating the opioid
epidemic in Monroe County.

Medically Assisted Treatment at the Monroe County Jail
In January 2019, the University of Baltimore issued Monroe County a $250,000 grant to
bring Medically Assisted Treatment (MAT) into the Monroe County Jail (MCJ). The new
program will combine behavioral and drug therapies (i.e. methadone, suboxone, and
buprenorphine) to help inmates through opioid withdrawal. When inmates receiving MAT are
released, they will continue their treatment in an outpatient facility. This response to the
epidemic in Monroe County is medically focused, even though the program’s location is in a jail.
The Monroe County Sheriffs office is the only law enforcement agency in the country to receive
this funding (Thompson, 2019). This is an interesting point and may suggest that criminal justice
agencies do not usually receive government funding for medically focused interventions. This is
also the reason I chose to analyze MAT at MCJ in this paper.
There is a wide range of literature supporting MAT’s effectiveness in reducing harm
associated with the opioid crisis. Due to the abundance of empirical studies that have found this
medical intervention is successful, scholars claim MAT is the central component of evidencebased treatment for opioid use disorder, regardless of whether it is combined with behavioral
therapy (Knudsen, 2015). A randomized clinical trial conducted between 2009 and 2013 found
that participants in the medication assisted treatment group were significantly more likely to
continue engaging in treatment and had significantly reduced days of self-reported illicit opioid
use per week (Donofrio et al., 2015). Other studies have found similar results, in addition to
findings of reduced risks of infectious-disease transmission and of engagement in criminal
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activities (Volkow et al., 2014). The findings of these studies imply that MAT is effective in
combating the epidemic and explain why Monroe County wanted the intervention implemented
in the local jail.

Conclusion
As United States communities and citizens continue to fight against the opioid epidemic,
different interventions have been created to decrease overdoses and disrupt drug markets. The
purpose of this paper was to highlight the multiple interventions in Monroe County that have
responded to the opioid crisis. While the interventions have the same general goal, dissimilar
strategies are used with each intervention. Some tactics may be more medically focused, while
others are focused more punitively and are handled with criminal justice sectors. It is important
to discover which type of intervention is the best practice for tackling the opioid crisis. With data
on opioid overdoses only beginning to be accurately tracked and recorded recently, it is difficult
to evaluate the effectiveness of each of these programs. By reviewing the literature on each
intervention and conducting empirical evaluations on these programs, greater knowledge will be
available on which practices are most successful in stopping the opioid epidemic in the country.
Although the data in this paper continues to reflect high numbers of fatal and non-fatal
overdoses within Monroe County, there is hope within the grim statistics. Across the US and
locally in Monroe County, there are constantly new interventions being implemented to combat
the epidemic. Continuing to study and research the different methods used in each intervention
will serve as an important tool in preventing future destruction from the opioid epidemic.

55

“Analysis of Opioid Overdoses in Monroe County”
Working Paper IV
Abigail Hallowell

56

Introduction
The opioid epidemic in the United States has negatively impacted the lives of thousands
of people. The federal government declared the opioid problem a public health crisis in 2017,
ending the year with over 40,000 fatal drug overdoses involving any opioid. Due to the severity
of the crisis, government officials have responded by beginning to collect opioid overdose data
and implementing interventions to combat overdoses. To evaluate the effectiveness of the
responses in reducing opioid overdoses, it is essential that we gain an empirical understanding of
what different factors influence if an overdose ends in a fatality.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze opioid overdose data in Monroe County, NY. Using a
secondary data analysis of this data we can attempt to analyze if there are any factors impacting
fatal overdoses in the area. The research questions this study will address are;
1. What factors impact if an opioid overdose will be fatal?
2. Does the administration of Narcan during an overdose decrease the likelihood that an
overdose will be fatal?
3. Does having a prior overdose history increase the likelihood that an overdose will be
fatal?
Finding answers to these questions may help to inform local policy makers on the best practices
to combat the opioid crisis. There are limitations to what we can conclude from this study that
will be discussed later in the paper. Nonetheless, it is important to conduct this analysis to
attempt to provide an empirical assessment of how different variables affect fatal opioid
overdoses.
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Importance of the Epidemic
A crisis unique to the United States, the opioid problem has become a significant and
frightening topic in the country. Opioid related overdoses have been increasing since the mid1990s and the increases have become more severe in recent years. In 1999, drug overdoses
claimed 16,849 American lives. In 2007, overdoses were responsible for 36,010 deaths. In 2017,
fatal drug overdoses in the United States claimed 70,237 lives. Out of those fatal overdoses,
about 68% involved an opioid. This is an enormous increase since 1999, and the number of
overdoses has almost doubled since 2007 (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2019). The
significant increase in overdoses shown over the last two decades highlights the importance of
the opioid epidemic in this country. Table one below displays the increase in fatal opioid
overdoses in three separate waves since 1999;
Table 2.

Three Waves Opioid Overdoses in the US 1999-2017
DEATHS PER 100,000 POPULATION

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Commonly Prescribed Opioids

Heroin

Other Synthetic Opioids

*Source (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2019)
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Table one illustrates three different types of fatal opioid overdoses. The first type – and
the first wave – of overdoses is commonly prescribed opioids. This type of opioid comes in the
form of prescription medications including methadone, oxycontin, hydrocodone, codeine, etc. A
drastic increase in the number of opioid prescriptions began during the mid-1990s, and from
1999 to 2011, consumption of hydrocodone more than doubled and consumption of oxycodone
increased by nearly 500%. From 1997 to 2011, there was a 900% increase in individuals seeking
treatment for addiction to opioid pain relievers (Kolodny et al., 2015). The increases in fatal
prescribed opioid overdoses that are seen from 1999 to 2011 imply the leniency in opioid
prescribing policies during this time.
The next wave of fatal overdoses shown in Table one is from heroin. This dangerous drug
is more potent than opium or morphine and is often taken intravenously by the user. Beginning
in 2007, many of the opioid addicted persons in the country found an easier way to achieve their
high, for a cheaper price. The chart may also imply a disruption in some people’s supply of
opioid prescriptions. The disruption in their supply may have pushed them to purchase opioids
from the illegal drug market. Around the time we see an increase in heroin overdoses, the
government had begun regulating opioid prescribing policies, making the drug difficult to access
for many already addicted. According to the federal government's National Survey on Drug Use
and Health (NSDUH), 4 out of 5 current heroin users report that their opioid use began with
prescription drugs (Muhuri, Gfroerer, & Davies, 2013). In a sample of opioid addicted
individuals who switched from opioid prescription pills to heroin, 94% reported doing so
because the pills “were far more expensive and harder to obtain” (Cicero et al., 2014).
The final wave of overdoses to discuss involves other synthetic opioids (fentanyl,
tramadol, etc.). When synthetic opioids were introduced to the drug market around 2013, fatal
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drug overdoses began to increase more drastically than the country has ever seen before. The
primary synthetic opioid being cut into heroin is fentanyl, and the drug is 25 to 50 times more
potent than heroin (Lui, Pei, & Soto, 2018). The implications from Table one shows the
increased use of synthetic opioids in the country after the drug was introduced in 2013.
Monroe County

Before conducting the analysis, it is important to recognize the importance of the opioid
epidemic in Monroe County, NY. In 2017, the opioid overdose death rate (per 100,000
population) in the United States was 14.9. This is a 12% increase from 2016. In the state of New
York, the opioid overdose death rate is was 16.1. This is higher than the national average and it
is a 7% increase from the previous year (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2019). In the Western
district of New York located near the Finger Lakes region, Monroe County’s population is
almost 750,000 (US Census, 2019).
Monroe County has experienced the devastation and loss like many other counties
throughout the United States. In just over three years, the county experienced 2,459 overdoses,
with 418 of them ending in a fatality. Made up of several towns and the city of Rochester, opioid
overdoses have occurred in each of these geographic locations in the county, predominantly
taking place in Rochester. A medium-sized city, Rochester has had an intense difficulty dealing
with opioid overdoses. Table two illustrates the total number of fatal and non-fatal overdoses in
Monroe County, sorted by the town or city the overdose occurred in, from January 1st, 2016 to
April 1st, 2019 (n=2,459);
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Table 3.
Town
Brighton
Brockport
Chili
East Rochester
Fairport
Gates
Greece
Hamlin
Henrietta
Hilton
Honeoye Falls
Irondequoit
Ogden
Parma
Penfield
Perinton
Pittsford
Riga
Rochester
Rush
Scottsville
Sweden
Webster
Total

Overdoses
27
24
37
26
20
74
205
21
76
14
5
90
54
15
75
18
29
2
1,590
5
5
10
37
2459

*Table created by Abigail Hallowell, Research Assistant with the Center for Public Safety Initiatives (CPSI)

Monroe County had a total of 2,459 overdoses from January 2016 to April 2019. As
shown in the table, over half over those overdoses (n=1,590) were in the city of Rochester. In the
chart, it appears residents in the city of Rochester have been impacted by opioid overdoses more
severely than suburban residents. However, it is important to note that many residents in suburbs
surrounding the inner-city may likely be traveling into the city to purchase the drugs, and then
overdosing there. Also, this chart does not consider the rate of overdoses based on population
size. The population in the city of Rochester is about 208,000 – significantly larger than the
population any of the towns listed in the chart. These towns likely have lower overdose numbers
than Rochester because their population is much smaller.
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The next table worth examining illustrates a breakdown of all opioid overdoses over a 3year period. Table 3 contains all fatal and non-fatal opioid overdoses in Monroe County from
January 2016 to January 2018;
Table 4.

1200

Fatal and Non-Fatal Opioid Overdoses in Monroe
County from 2016-2018

1000
800
600

85%

400

82%

200
0

24%

76%

2016 (n=342)

15%

18%
2017 (n=807)
Fatal

2018 (n=1,133)

Non-Fatal

*Graph created by Abigail Hallowell, Research Assistant with CPSI

In 2016, there were 82 fatal overdoses and 260 non-fatal overdoses. In 2017, the number of fatal
overdoses almost doubled (n=145), while non-fatal overdoses almost tripled (n=662). In 2018,
there was a slight increase for fatal overdoses from the previous year (n=145). The same year, a
similar pattern is reflected with non-fatal overdoses drastically increasing (n=967). The high
number of fatal and non-fatal overdoses shown in the graph reflect the prominence of opioid
abuse in Monroe County.
Though the total number of fatal opioid overdoses has continued increasing since 2016,
the percentage of overdoses that were fatal has decreased. In 2016, the percent of overdoses that
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were fatal was 24%. In 2017, 17% of opioid overdoses were fatal in Monroe County. This is a
6% decrease from the previous year. In 2018, after the implementation of Narcan, only 14.6% of
overdoses in the county were fatal. This is almost a 10% decrease in the percent of fatal
overdoses since 2016. These results imply that something is being done in the county to decrease
the percentage of fatal opioid overdoses. It may be due to the implementation of an intervention
targeted at fighting the opioid problem in Monroe County.

Narcan
To combat opioid overdoses in the county, local officials in Monroe County began
responding by offering education, training, and the distribution of Narcan. A medical
intervention that has become more popular in recent years, the use and distribution of
Naloxone/Narcan, is intended to reduce fatal opioid overdoses. Narcan is a drug that can
temporarily reverse the potentially deadly effects of opioid overdose during an emergency. In
2014, the FDA approved the use of Narcan in an opioid emergency for the general public (Pryor,
2017).
In January 2018, the Monroe County Heroin Task Force was implemented to combat
opioid overdoses locally. The Heroin Task Force is a collaboration between several government
and law enforcement agencies in Monroe County that was created in response to the opioid
epidemic. After implementation of the intervention, the Task Force increased efforts to expand
the use and distribution of Narcan throughout the county. Also in January 2018, to assist the
Task Force’s effort in expanding the use of Narcan, the Monroe County Department of Public
Health claimed it would increase the availability of the drug (Opioid Action Plan, 2019). In
October 2018, Chief Mark Simmons of the Rochester City Police Department announced that all
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officers would be equipped with a Narcan kit and be trained on how to administer the drug
(Simmons, 2018). Table four illustrates the use of Narcan in opioid overdoses in Monroe County
from 2016 to 2018;
Table 4.

NARCAN ADMINISTRATION DURING OPIOID
OVERDOSES MONROE COUNTY 2016-2018
552

NUMBER OF OVERDOSES

600
500

393

400

332

300
200
100
0

135

153
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2017
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JUNE-DEC
2018

*Graph created by Abigail Hallowell, Research Assistant with CPSI

Table four shows an increase in the use of Narcan in Monroe County since 2017.
Although there was a decrease in use of Narcan in the first half of 2018, this decline is likely
spurious. The chart shows Narcan use spike back up during the second half of 2018. The
increased efforts to expand the use and distribution of Narcan is due directly to the drastic
increase in fatal opioid overdoses in the county. It is important to see the increase in the use of
Narcan during the past three years because it suggests we may see an improvement in overdoses
in the results sections of this paper.
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Methods
This research is intended to analyze what factors, if any, impact if an opioid overdose is
going to be fatal or not. To do this, I will conduct a secondary-data analysis of opioid overdose
data in Monroe County, NY from January 1st, 2016 to April 1st, 2019 to determine any
statistically significant findings (n=2,459). The data set had a total of 103 missing cases within
the independent and controlled variables. These cases were not included in the analysis or
logistic regression and our new sample does not include them (n=2,356). Because my dependent
variable in this experiment is dichotomous, I concluded that a logistical regression is the best
statistical method to use for this research. Also, due to the nature of studying social sciences and
specifically fatal opioid overdoses, I determined this the best methodology to achieve the goals
of this analysis.
Objectives

The main objective of this research is to evaluate factors that contribute to an overdose
being fatal or non-fatal in Monroe County. As stated earlier, the primary research questions I am
asking in this study are;
1. What factors impact if an opioid overdose will be fatal?
2. Does the administration of Narcan during an overdose decrease the likelihood that an
overdose will be fatal?
3. Does having a prior overdose history increase the likelihood that an overdose will be
fatal?
I hypothesize that there are outside influences that may significantly impact whether an
opioid overdose is fatal or not. Specifically, the two hypotheses are; (1) when the administration
of Narcan in overdoses increases, the likelihood of the overdose being fatal decreases and (2)
when the victim of the overdose incident has a prior history of overdose, the likelihood of the
overdose being fatal will increase. I believe hypothesis one to be significant because the
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reversing effects that Narcan has on a potentially fatal overdose is important. Because Narcan
can reverse these effects, I believe it will have a significant impact on if an overdose results in a
fatality or not. Hypothesis two may be important because if someone has a prior history of
overdosing, that may put them more at risk of having another overdose, this time possibly being
fatal. It is the goal of this research to answer these questions empirically using the best possible
methods to determine if there are any significant outcomes.
Operationalization of Variables

To empirically asses my hypotheses and research questions, the opioid overdose data has
been coded to allow a statistical regression analysis to be conducted. To conduct the statistical
analysis, I will operationalize my variables as follows;
1. Dependent Variable
• Fatal overdoses: This variable serves to measure whether an opioid overdose
resulted in the death of the victim. (1=Yes; 0=No)
2. Independent Variables
• Narcan administration: This variable serves to measure if Narcan was
administered to the victim during the opioid overdose. (1=Yes; 0=No).
• Prior overdose history: This variable serves to measure if the victim had a history
of prior overdose. (1=Yes; 0=No)
3. Controlled Variables
• Age of victim: This variable controls for the age of the victim during the time of
the overdose. (0-76 years old)
• Gender of victim: This variable control for the gender of the victim. (M=1; F=0)
• Race of victim: This variable controls for the race of the victim. (W=1; NW=0)
• Ethnicity of victim: This variable controls for the ethnicity of the victim. (H=1;
NH=0)
4. ‘Dummy’ Variable
• Year of overdose: It is important to highlight if the fatal overdose occurred before
or after the implementation of Narcan in January 2018. (2016-2017=0, 20182019=1).
Because my sample is of individual opioid overdoses, the unit of analysis is at the individual
level. My target population addresses individuals who are high-risk opioid users because they
have all overdosed on the drug.
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Data Collection

With overdose numbers continuing to rise, the Monroe County Heroin Task Force began
to track opioid overdose data in the county and has maintained a large data set of all reported
overdoses in Monroe County from January 2016 to April 1st, 2019 (n=2,459). The data set
contains qualitative information on each overdose victim and the details surrounding the
overdose. The Task Force works with their partners to attempt to have the local responding
police officers and Emergency Medical Technicians collect this data at every single overdose
occurrence in Monroe County. They also work closely with the Monroe County Medical
Examiner’s office to assemble data on fatal overdoses specifically (Monroe County Heroin Task
Force, 2018).
The Task Force’s data was retrieved from the Monroe Crime Analysis Center (MCAC),
an organization that works closely with the Center for Public Safety Initiatives (CPSI) at the
Rochester Institute of Technology. Because the data is confidential, I only gained access to it
through my employment with CPSI. Using this data, I will conduct a secondary-data analysis and
a logistical regression to determine if there are any statistically significant factors that are
impacting fatal opioid overdoses.

Descriptive Statistics
It is important to review the description of each variable in the study prior to analyzing
any findings. As stated earlier, to combat issues with internal validity, each variable within the
data set was examined and cleaned for missing cases. I also performed a cross tabulations
analysis of Narcan administration on fatal overdoses that is included in this section. The
descriptive details of the variables in this study are listed in Table five and discussed briefly
below.
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Table 5.

Variable

Percent Yes

Percent No

# Missing Cases

Fatal

17%

83% (n=401)

0

(n=1,955)
Narcan Administered

70.6%

29.4%

44

Prior OD History

69.4%

30.6%

37

Fatal Overdoses

I will first analyze the dependent variable in the study, fatal opioid overdoses. Within the
total opioid overdoses in the sample for our study (n=2,356), fatal and non-fatal overdoses were
both included. In Monroe County from January 2016 to April 2019, 83% of opioid overdoses
were non-fatal (n=2,041). The remaining 17% of opioid overdoses resulted in a fatality (n=418).
There were no missing cases within the dependent variable.
Narcan Administration

As shown in Table five, Narcan was administered 70.6% of the time (n=1,736). The drug
was not administered in 27.6% of the overdoses (n=679). In the Narcan variable, after cleaning
the data there were 44 missing cases, 31 were recorded as “unknown” and 13 were recorded as
blanks. When the case is recorded “unknown”, we cannot include that case within our sample
because assuming the victim was or was not administered Narcan may lead to statistical
inaccuracy in the findings of this study.
The overdoses in the sample that had Narcan administered (n=1,736), resulted in a
fatality 5.7% of the time (n=94). The overdoses within the sample that did not have Narcan
administered (n=679) resulted in a fatality almost half of the time (46.8%) (n=318). After a cross
tabulations analysis of Narcan and the dependent variable, there were some significant results.
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The analysis found that when Narcan is administered, the overdose is 94.6% more likely to be
non-fatal. Thus, when Narcan is administered, there is only a 5.4% chance of the overdose
resulting in a fatality. When not administered, there is a 46.8% chance that the overdose will
result in a fatality. These findings are statistically significant (p=.000).
Victim Prior Overdose History

This analysis includes prior overdose history of each overdose victim within our sample.
In the sample, 69.4% of the overdoses did not have a victim with a prior overdose history
(n=1,682). However, 30.6% of the overdoses contained a victim who had a record of a prior
overdose history (n=740). There were 36 missing cases within this variable.
Victim Gender

The first controlled variable to discuss is the gender of the victim in each overdose within
the sample. Out of the total overdoses in Monroe County in our sample, 72% of the overdose
victims were male (n=1,760) and 28% of them were female (n=699). There were no missing
cases within this variable.
Victim Race and Ethnicity

For the race and ethnicity variables in the study, 91% of the victims in each overdose in
our sample were white (n=2,211). The other 9% of the sample identified as non-white (n=266). It
is also important to analyze the ethnicity of the victim when analyzing their race. 87% of
overdose victims are non-Hispanic (n=2,134) and 13% of victims identified as Hispanic (n=313).
Race and ethnicity of the victim were the two controlled variables that also had missing cases
that were excluded from the analysis. Race contained 11 missing cases and ethnicity contained
12 missing cases.
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Victim Age

The final variable controlled for in the study, the victim’s age, had some interesting
findings. The median of ages is the sample was just below the mean at 33 years old. The mode,
or most repeated age in the sample, is 27 years old. The mean age of overdose victims in the
sample was 35.6 years old. However, there are outliers within the data set when discussing the
median age that are important to highlight.
The oldest age of the victim was 76 years old, and the youngest was 0 years old (9
months old). This case – and one other where the victim was 1 year old – throw off the average
age due to the dissimilar nature of these two overdoses. The two overdose cases are likely due to
an infant somehow accidently accessing their parent/guardian’s supply of opioids and ingesting
it. There was a case in Monroe County in 2018 of a 9-month old infant overdosing on their
parent’s illegal opioid drug. The mother and grandparents of the child were all charged with
endangering the welfare of a child (Thompson, 2018). There were no missing cases in this
variable.

Results
The logistic regression that was conducted for this study uses an odds ratio to determine
the odds of a fatal overdose being more or less likely when the independent variables are present.
Based on the results of the analysis, I found that in Monroe County, NY, the administration of
Narcan did have a significant impact on fatal overdoses in Monroe County. The analysis also
revealed a significant impact of victim age on fatal overdoses. This allowed us to reject the null
hypothesis in hypothesis one. However, the analysis found there were no statistically significant
impacts of victim prior overdose history on fatal overdoses in Monroe County. We accept the
null hypothesis of hypothesis two. The analysis also revealed a significant impact of victim age
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on fatal overdoses. There were no other significant findings from the remaining variables that
were included in the study. Table six summarizes the findings of the logistic regression;
Table 6.

Logistic Regression Analysis of Variables – Odds Ratio
B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp. (B)

Narcan Administered

-2.683

.134

401.924

1

.000

.068

Prior OD History

-.237

.145

2.695

1

.101

.789

Victim Ethnicity

-.167

.206

.655

1

.418

.846

Victim Race

.120

.226

.282

1

.595

1.128

Victim Gender

-.153

.143

1.137

1

.286

.858

Victim Age

.022

.005

15.976

1

.000

1.022

Year

-.131

.076

2.963

1

.085

.877

Constant

263.524 153.511 2.943

1

.086

2800E+114

*Variable(s) entered: Narcan Administered, Victim Gender, Victim Race, Prior OD History, Victim Ethnicity, Year, Victim Age.

Table six represents the logistic regression analysis using an odds ratio. The Exp.(B)
column represents the odds. The table illustrates that when controlling for victim gender, victim
race, victim ethnicity, and victim age, the odds of an overdose being fatal are expected to be 0.68
time less when Narcan is administered. This finding is statistically significant (p=.000). We can
reject null hypothesis one. When controlling for those same variables, the regression found there
were no significant increases or decreases in odds of an overdose being fatal for prior overdose
history, victim race, victim ethnicity, victim gender, or year of overdose. We fail to reject null
hypothesis two. However, the regression determined that as the victim’s age increases, the odds
of an overdose being fatal are expected to increase by 1.02. This unexpected finding is
statistically significant (p=.000).
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Implications and Recommendations
The implications that can be drawn from the findings are extensive, and they are all
essential to discuss when addressing how to best combat the opioid epidemic. The analysis
revealed some interesting implications that can be made regarding the outcomes of each
hypotheses of the study. For my first hypothesis, the outcomes indicate significant positive
impacts that the administration of Narcan during an overdose emergency has on fatal overdoses.
This implies the success of Narcan in combating the opioid epidemic in Monroe County. The
results also imply that Narcan may be the reason the percent of fatal overdoses have been
decreasing in the county (shown in Table 3). The use and distribution of Narcan should continue
and the Heroin Task Force and their partners should continue the increased expansion of the drug
throughout the county.
To continue researching the impacts of Narcan in the county it would be helpful to begin
recording the time of the overdose versus the time Narcan was administered. There may be a
significance in how long the victim has to wait after they overdose before they receive Narcan. It
may also be important to collect data on who administers the Narcan (person with victim during
time of overdose, EMT, law enforcement officer, hospital staff member, etc.) to look for any
significant differences in fatal overdoses based on this variable.
Our second hypothesis was incorrect, finding no significance of the victim having a prior
overdose history. There are several possible implications regarding this finding. First, it implies
that overdosing in the past does not have an impact on future overdoses being fatal or non-fatal.
It may also imply that people who have a history of overdosing are prepared for an overdose
occurrence and may have Narcan available. Data should continue to be collected on this variable,
and in further detail, similar to Narcan. The number of prior overdoses a victim has had and if
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the person received Narcan during their prior overdoses may both be important pieces of
information when assessing this variable. This may lead to further implications on Narcan
administration. It would also help determine if the number of a victim’s previous overdoses
impacts the odds of an overdose being fatal.
An important finding, as age increases odds of an overdose being fatal increase, has a few
indications for the opioid epidemic. This may imply that the wear and tear abusing opioids does
to the body may be more difficult for an older person to handle. They may have other existing
health issues that derive from aging that opioid use effects. Another implication from this
outcome may be that an older person likely has been using opioids for longer, and has had more
damage done to their body, and has a less likely chance of surviving future overdoses. This
finding and its implications are grim. Scientific and medical analyses should be conducted on
this topic to further knowledge on how age impacts fatal overdoses.
Another interesting aspect of our data to discuss is the disparities in the race of overdose
victims in our sample. There were no statistically significant findings on race impacting fatal
overdoses. As stated earlier, 91% of the overdose victims are white and 9% of them are nonwhite. Non-white can consist of Black, Asian, Native American, etc. In table two earlier in the
paper, we see that the most overdoses in the county are occurring within the city of Rochester.
The city of Rochester has a population of about 208,000 people. According to the US Census,
40.7% of the city’s population identified as Black or African American as of July 2018. This
percent along with the predominant rate of overdoses occurring within the city limits would
suggest that there would be more overdoses with Black victims. The low percentage of black
victims in the sample implies there is a reason that Black residents of Rochester’s inner-city are
not using opioids as much as whites. Researchers can continue to speculate on the different
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theories behinds this, possibly looking into how Black Americans history and experiences with
drugs and the US government may have impacted their use of opioids today.
Lastly, the findings on the year of the overdose variable was of little surprise. Although
Narcan was officially implemented in Monroe County in January 2018, the drug has been around
to reverse overdose effects for a while. Monroe County was already using Narcan in 2016 and
2017 to treat opioid overdoses. Due to this, there was no significant differences within fatal
overdoses based on if the overdose occurred before or after January 2018.

Limitations
Because of time and resource restrictions of this study, an analysis of secondary data was
the best method to use when addressing my research questions. There are multiple challenges
that are faced when conducting a secondary-data analysis, and there are unique issues when
dealing with secondary overdose data. For example, there may be several non-fatal overdoses in
the area that were not recorded because 911 was never called. The nature of opioid use is illegal
and private, and we cannot be sure how many overdoses in the county were missed in our
sample. Although missing these overdoses is a limitation of the study, a sample of over 2,000
overdose cases was enough to conduct an empirical analysis with accurate findings.
The Monroe County Heroin Task Force began in 2018 and retrieves their data from
different agencies like local police departments, public health agencies, EMT companies, etc.
The different agencies may not record the same number of overdoses, or the responders may not
record all necessary information (i.e. Narcan administration, prior overdose history, etc.). These
inconsistencies in the data can be detrimental when attempting study overdoses in a scientific
manner.
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Another limitation in our sample is within the race and ethnicity variables. Rochester, NY
has a large Puerto Rican population, many of which identify as Hispanic. However, some may
identify as white or other. Also, many victims who identified as Hispanic (Y=1) were also
recorded in the data set as white (W=1) and this may give inaccuracy to our race variable. The
issues with recording these variables in certain cases in our sample may give inaccurate findings
on the outcomes of race and ethnicity in our logistic regression.
Often in social and criminal justice agencies, data is not accurately recorded or may not
be being recorded at all. An example of this can be found in the inconsistencies within crime
statistics from the FBI’S Uniform Crime Report (UCR). The UCR often underreports on data
due to how the data are being collected. The UCR retrieves its information from police agencies
around the country, neglecting issues such as crimes that go unreported to the police or crimes
that do not result in an arrest (Pepper and Petrie, 2003). To highlight possible issues with internal
validity in our study, I will use an example directly from the Monroe County Heroin Task Force.
There are discrepancies in the numbers of opioid overdoses that Monroe County has
recorded that can be found online. The Monroe County Heroin Task Force contradicts
themselves in some of their data that they offer to the public. The Opioid Action Plan, created by
a few main members of the Heroin Task Force, offers opioid overdoses data for Monroe County
on its website. On the Opioid Action Plan’s website, the opioid overdose data they list for 2016
and 2017 does not match the data from the Heroin Task Force’s website. The discrepancies are
shown in Table 7;
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Table 7.

Monroe County Fatal and Non-Fatal Opioid Overdose Data
Comparisons 2016 -2017
600

546
467

Overdoses

500

467

400
300
200

169

220
159

160

126

100
0

2016 Fatal OD

2017 Fatal OD
Heroin Task Force

2016 Non-Fatal OD

2017 Non-Fatal OD

Opioid Action Plan

*Source: Monroe County Medical Examiner’s Office & NYS Department of Health Quarterly Opioid County Report.

Table seven illustrates that in 2016 Fatal Overdoses, the difference between numbers for
the Task Force and the Action Plan was only (+/-) 10 (n=169, n=159). However, in every other
variable there is a difference of at least (+/-) 80 overdoses between the two agency’s recordings.
The Opioid Action Plan is part of the Task Force, yet they still do not have the same overdose
numbers. It is worth noting that in 2016 and 2017, before the formation of the Monroe County
Heroin Task Force, it is possible that there is some inaccuracy in undercounting overdoses within
the data. Local officials had not yet implemented the Monroe County Heroin Task Force,
requiring the precise tracking and recording of opioid overdoses. Thus, the numbers of overdoses
that we have for those years should be met with skepticism, as they may be higher than what was
documented. The purpose of the graph is to highlight possible challenges with internal validity in
the sample. It is extremely important that government agencies continue to work together to
obtain accurate and detailed data on opioid overdoses.
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Conclusion
The opioid epidemic in Monroe County is a continuing issue, and the use and distribution
of Narcan has been a leading intervention to try and combat it. By analyzing opioid overdoses in
the county, a more empirical understand of fatal overdoses can be achieved. The effectiveness of
Narcan is an imperative finding, and the outcomes of the other variables are just significant. The
findings of the analysis will likely lead most to formulate more questions about the opioid
epidemic and how to stop it. Although there are limitations to the outcomes of this study, the
information presented is important so other researchers can continue the research that has been
started. It would be useful for more empirical analyses of opioid overdose data to be done so
more accurate conclusions can be drawn regarding how to best fight against the opioid crisis in
the nation.
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